CFPB Request for Information: Promoting Access to Mortgage Credit

CFPB Request for Information Summary: Promoting Access to Mortgage Credit
12 CFR Parts 1027 and 1026

July 2026
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued a Request for Information (RIF) seeking comments from the public on potential regulatory changes that may reduce regulatory burden and promote access to mortgage credit. 

Comments must be received by August 10, 2026 and the RIF can be found here.

Summary

The CFPB seeks to reduce unwarranted regulatory burden to ensure that creditworthy borrowers can access mortgage credit.  The Bureau is requesting information on industry and consumer burdens related to integrated mortgage disclosures required under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). The RIF focuses on requirements related to TILA/RESPA integrated disclosures or TRID, the right of rescission, and reverse mortgage disclosures.

The RIF is being issued in accordance with Executive Order 14393 entitled “Promoting Access to Mortgage Credit,” which calls for implementation of policy that improves the availability of affordable mortgage credit; facilitates community bank engagement in mortgage activity and modernizes origination and closing standards to reduce lending costs.  Section 2 of the EO specifically requires the Bureau to do the following:

  • Propose amendments to Regulation Z that tailor Ability to Repay (ATR) and Qualified Mortgage (QM) requirements as well as TILA, RESPA and TRID rules for smaller entities;
  • Replace TRID timing rules with a materiality-based standard that preserves consumer clarity and reduces closing delays; and
  • Exempt rate-and-term refinancing (including cash-out refinancing) from rescission rights.

Request for Comments

The Bureau is seeking feedback from stakeholders on the impact of potential regulatory changes pertaining to: (i) TILA-RESPA integrated disclosure requirements; (ii) TILA rescission rights; and (iii) reverse mortgages.  The Bureau requests (where possible) comments include supporting data or other information on the advantages/disadvantages of suggested regulatory changes. 

The RIF poses 22 questions divided into the following four categories:

  • Timing Requirements – TRID Rule and Right of Recission
  • Other TRID Requirements
  • Tailored Requirements for Small Banks and Credit Unions
  • Reverse Mortgages

NASCUS Summary: FinCEN & Federal Banking Agencies Proposed Rule for Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer Customer Identification Program
June 2026

On June 18, 2026, FinCEN announced a joint proposed rule with the federal banking agencies, including NCUA, to implement provisions of the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (GENIUS Act) titled Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer Customer Identification Program. Under the GENIUS Act, Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuers (PPSIs) are to be treated as financial institutions (FIs) under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and requires issuers to maintain effective customer identification programs (CIP).

Comments are due August 21, 2026.

Summary

The proposal would establish CIP requirements for PPSIs that largely align with existing CIP requirements applicable to traditional FIs. The proposal would work in conjunction with the April 2026 proposed rule establishing Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) and sanctions compliance program requirements for PPSIs. The NASCUS summary of the April proposal is available here.

Key aspects of this proposal include:

Written CIP Program

The proposal would establish minimum standards around the requirement for a PPSI to establish and maintain a written CIP that is appropriate for the PPSI’s size and business.  As with traditional FIs, the CIP would be required as part of the PPSI’s AML/CFT program.  The proposal discusses primary and secondary-market activities and states that the CIP requirement would be limited to primary-market activities.

Definitions

The proposal introduces three new definitions regarding the proposed CIP obligation: Account, Customer, and Digital Asset Service Provider. The proposal states the definitions are “designed to clarify that a PPSI’s CIP obligation extends to direct relationships, i.e., primary market activity, and does not extend to activities where the only interaction is with a PPSI’s smart contract.

Account

The proposed definition would resemble how account is defined in other CIP rules, “but contains unique provisions that reflect the kinds of activities in which PPSIs can engage.” Consideration is also given to the types of accounts PPSIs may maintain as required by the BSA.

The formal definition is defined within the proposal as: “a formal relationship between a PPSI and a customer, established to provide or engage in services, dealings, or other financial transactions.”  The proposal states the language “mimics” other CIP rules under the BSA to have consistency and the ability for institutions to rely on other CIP procedures.

The proposal includes examples of activities that may constitute an account relationship: issuing and redeeming payment stablecoins, managing related reserves, providing custodial or safekeeping services for stablecoins or reserve assets, activities supporting those functions, and certain authorized digital asset service provider activities. The examples are based on activities PPSIs are permitted to conduct under the GENIUS Act.

The proposal also recognizes the practical limitations of applying CIP requirements to all payment stablecoin activity. It states that a person would not be considered a customer “where a transfer is the result of third parties and a payment stablecoin user’s only interaction with the PPSI is through a smart contract.”  As well, the proposal acknowledges trying to impose CIP obligations on any payment stablecoin transfer with a PPSI would create “global obligations” to collect and verify customer information which would be “nearly impossible” for PPSIs and “could potentially cripple the industry.”

Customer

The proposal would define customer as the following:

  • A person that opens a new account; and
  • An individual who opens a new account for
    • An individual who lacks legal capacity, such as a minor; or
    • An entity that is not a legal person, such as a civic club

The proposal states that “customer” would not include:

  • An FI regulated by a Federal functional regulator or a bank regulated by a State bank regulator
  • Certain exempt persons
  • A person that has an existing account with the PPSI, provided the PPSI has a reasonable belief that it knows the true identity of the person; or
  • A person acquiring or redeeming a payment stablecoin through means other than directly from or directly to the PPSI

Digital Asset Service Provider

The proposal would define digital asset service provider “for the purposes of a PPSI’s CIP obligations because the term is used in the proposed definition of account.” The definition would largely mirror the definition provided in the GENIUS Act, with “certain modifications in light of preexisting FinCEN regulatory definitions.”

The proposed definition would include entities that, for compensation, facilitate the exchange, transfer, custody, or issuance of digital assets.  It would exclude certain activities and participants that are not acting as financial intermediaries, including distributed ledger protocols, self-custodial software interfaces, transaction validation activities, and certain liquidity-provision activities.

Identity Verification Procedures

The proposal would require the CIP include risk-based procedures around the verification of individuals to the “extent reasonable and practicable” to enable the PPSI to form a reasonable belief that it knows the true identity of its customers.  The procedures should be tailored to the risks that are presented by the PPSI’s accounts, methods of account opening, available identifying information, and the PPSI’s size, location, and customer base.

The proposal would permit PPSIs to verify customer identities through documentary and non-documentary methods and would require procedures that address occurrences where a PPSI cannot form a reasonable belief that it knows the customer’s true identity.  It also addresses situations where, based on a PPSI’s risk assessment, a new account is opened by a customer that is not an individual, the PPSI will obtain information for those who have control of the account, when the PPSI cannot verify the true identity of the customer.

The proposal acknowledges that while the majority of customers can be verified through documentary and non-documentary methods, there may be circumstances where a PPSI cannot form a reasonable belief that it knows a customer’s true identity. When this occurs procedures should describe: (1) when the PPSI should not open the account; (2) the terms where a customer may use the account while the PPSI attempts to verify identity; (3) when the PPSI should close an account after identity attempts fail; and (4) when the PPSI should file a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) in accordance with applicable law and regulation.

Customer Information Required

The proposal would require PPSIs to obtain identifying information similar to existing CIP requirements.  Prior to account opening, PPSIs would need to obtain: (1) name; (2) date of birth, for an individual; or date of formation, for a person that is not an individual; (3) address; and (4) an identification number.

The proposal would require that a PPSI collect a physical residential or business street address for an individual. Post office (PO) box, virtual offices, along with commercial mail receiving agencies would not be acceptable types of addresses.

The proposal requires collection of identification numbers.  For U.S. persons a tax identification number (TIN) would be required.  For non-U.S. persons the identification number could be one or more of the following: a TIN, passport number and country of issuance, alien identification card number, or number and country of issuance of any other government-issued document demonstrating nationality or residence and containing a photograph or similar safeguard.  For a non-US person that is not an individual that does not have an identification number, the PPSI must request alternative government-issued documentation certifying the existence of the person.

Digital Identity Tools

The proposal states that the agencies propose “that technological variation and innovation are best accounted for by maintaining the flexibility in the proposal relating to how a PPSI verifies a customer’s identity.”  The agencies acknowledge that digital identity tools have become more “common place and more sophisticated.”

The proposal addresses how PPSIs may treat digital identity tools differently.  Government-issued digital credentials, such as a mobile driver’s license, may be treated similarly to traditional identification, while certain private-sector identity solutions may be used as part of a non-documentary verification process based on the PPSI’s risk assessment.

Reliance

The proposal would permit a PPSI to rely on another federally regulated  financial institution to perform certain CIP procedures, provide the reliance is reasonable, the institution is subject to AML/CFT and CIP requirements, and the parties have a contractual arrangement that includes annual certification requirements.  The proposal notes that reliance does not transfer responsibility for CIP compliance, and the PPSI remains ultimately responsible for meeting its CIP obligations.

The proposal notes that the reliance framework is generally consistent with the existing CIP requirements under the BSA.  However, it acknowledges that it may create a distinction between federally regulated and state-qualified PPSIs, as reliance would be limited to entities with oversight from federal regulators. Therefore, a state-qualified PPSI could rely on the CIP procedures of a federally regulated PPSI, but a federally regulated PPSI could not rely on a state-qualified PPSI because they are not overseen by a federal regulator.

Recordkeeping

The proposal would require that the CIP include procedures relating to maintaining a record of all information obtained by the PPSI. At a minimum, the recordkeeping would require including: (1) all identifying information about a customer obtained under the CIP; (2) a description of any document relied on to verify the identity of the customer, including type of document, identification number on document, place of issuance, date of issuance and expiration (if applicable); (3) a description of the methods and results of measures undertaken to verify the identity of a customer; and (4) a description of the resolution of each substantive discrepancy discovered when verifying the identifying information obtained.

The proposal would require PPSIs to retain customer identification information for five years after an account is closed and identity verification records for five years after the record is created.   

Key Considerations

  • The proposal includes several requests for comments, including:
    • Whether the proposed “formal relationship” standard within the account definition is sufficiently clear.
    • Whether regulatory text related to verifiable credentials and digital identity solutions should be included. 
    • Whether CIP requirements should extend to secondary markets.

NASCUS Summary re: Federal Agency Joint Financial Data Transparency Act (FDTA) Joint Data Standards Final Rule
12 CFR Part 1077

The OCC, Board, FDIC, NCUA, CFPB, FHFA, CFTC, SEC and Treasury published a final joint rule to establish data standards to promote interoperability of financial regulatory data across these agencies.  The standards established in accordance with this joint rule will later be considered for potential incorporation into data standards to be adopted for certain collections of information in separate rulemakings by the agencies or through other agency actions. The joint rule does not change any reporting requirements without further action by the agencies.

The joint rule becomes effective on October 1, 2026.  The joint rule can be found here.

Summary

The Financial Data Transparency Act of 2022 (FDTA) directs the OCC, the Board, FDIC, NCUA, CFPB, FHFA, SEC and Treasury to jointly establish data standards through rulemaking. The FDTA also directs the Agencies to issue individual rules adopting applicable joint standards for certain collections of information under their respective purview. 

Joint Agency Rulemaking
The amended Act adds new Section 124.  Section 124(b) of the Financial Stability Act directs the Agencies to jointly issue regulations establishing data standards for (i) certain collections of information reported to each Agency by financial entities and (ii) the data collected from the Agencies on behalf of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC).  Section 124(c) requires the joint standards include common identifiers including a common nonproprietary legal entity identifier that is available under an open license for all entities required to report to the Agencies.  In addition, Section 124 (c) of the Act directs the Agencies to consult with other Federal departments and agencies and multiagency initiatives responsible for Federal data standards and to see to promote interoperability of financial regulatory data across members of the FSOC.

Agency specific rulemaking
The FDTA also requires each implementing Agency to “adopt by rule” data standards for certain collections of information.  Data standards must incorporate and ensure compatibility with applicable joint standards and the data standards must take effect no later than two years after the final joint rule is promulgated. 

The FDTA states that each implementing agency (i) may scale data reporting requirements to reduce any unjustified burden on smaller entities affected by the regulations and (ii) must seek to minimize disruptive changes to those entities/persons.  Each agency will determine the feasibility of adopting/implementing the joint standards for the collections of information specified in the FDTA. 

Joint Agency v. Individual Agency Standards
The FDTA has two rulemaking requirements: (i) a joint agency rulemaking, in which the Agencies must issue this final joint rule to establish the joint standards; and (ii) subsequent agency-specific rulemakings, in which the implementing agency must consider for adoption the specific data standards to be used for certain collections of information. 

The joint standards are only applicable to the Agencies themselves.  They do not change existing reporting obligations of any person or entity and therefore, will not have a direct economic impact on any person or entity. 

The joint stands will affect an implementing agency’s obligations (in their agency specific rulemakings) in that the FDTA requires each agency to adopt data standards that incorporate and ensure compatibility with applicable joint standards established under the joint final rule.

NASCUS Summary: CFPB Statement on Ability to Repay and Immigration Status
June 2026

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued a statement reminding creditors of their obligations under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and White House Executive Order #14406 titled “Restoring Integrity to America’s Financial System.”

The statement became effective on June 8, 2026 and can be found here.

Summary

The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) requires creditors to assess consumers’ ability to repay before offering mortgages and certain open-end credit products.  The statement is intended to reiterate to creditors that TILA provisions require creditors to consider a consumer’s immigration status during credit decisions. In particular, where a consumer’s immigration status may subject him/her to possible removal from the United States and how that could impact the consumer’s income and ability to repay the debt.

TILA and Regulation Z require lenders to make a “reasonable and good faith” determination (before extending credit) that the consumer will have a reasonable ability to repay the loan according to the loan terms.

In addition, the statement takes into account the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and Regulation B, which permits a creditor to take into consideration an applicant’s immigrant status into account. The Bureau believes this information is necessary to determine to highlight potential underwriting risks and help a creditor get clarity around their rights and remedies regarding repayment.

The guidance also notes the importance of continued access to employment and how this factor is an important component of a creditor’s analysis. The guidance reminds creditors that are determining repayment ability based (at least in part) on an individual’s U.S. based employment income must take into consideration information that may impact access to continued U.S. employment/income.  If there is documentation in the consumer’s application that indicates a consumer’s repayment ability will change if their immigration status changes, a creditor must consider that information in credit decisions.

NASCUS Final Rule Summary
Dependent Care and Board Member Expense Reimbursement
June 2026

On June 8, 2026, the NCUA Board approved a final rule for Dependent Care and Board Member Reimbursement. The final rule amends the regulations concerning the reimbursement of reasonable expenses for Federal Credit Union (FCU), and corporate FCU, officials, to remove potential issues to better support volunteer service.

This final rule does not apply to Federally Insured State-Chartered Credit Unions (FISCUs), which will remain subject to state law.

The final rule can be read here: Dependent Care and Board Member Reimbursement.

Final Rule is effective July 9, 2026.

Summary

The rule’s goal is to clarify that dependent care expenses incurred by volunteer officials of a FCU may be considered reasonable expenses in certain circumstances and to establish parameters around who qualifies for reimbursement.

Key Change:

The final rule amends the definition of compensation under Part 701.33 to exclude dependent care costs incurred by volunteer officials while they are participating in board meetings or other official credit union duties.  This will permit FCUs to reimburse volunteer officials for reasonable dependent care expenses.

NCUA stated that the change will provide more flexibility for FCU boards to adopt reimbursement policies that are tailored to their size, region, and operational needs.  

NASCUS Final Rule Summary
NCUA Vital Records Preservation
June 2026

On June 15, 2026, the NCUA Board adopted a final rule revising Part 749 record preservation requirements for credit unions in the event of a catastrophic act. The rule applies to federally insured state credit unions by reference in § 741.215.

The Final Rule can be read here: Catastrophic Act Preparedness.

The final rule is effective July 16, 2026.

Summary

The final rule builds upon the NCUA proposed rule issued on March 11, 2026, which asked for comments on ways to improve and update the vital records preservation program guidelines and regulation.  NASCUS filed comments relating to the proposal which can be read: Records Preservation Comments.

The final rule removes both Appendix A – Record Retention Guidelines and Appendix B – Catastrophic Preparedness Guidelines from Part 749. The Board determined that both appendices were intended as guidance rather than regulatory requirements which created possible confusion regarding regulatory expectations

The Board also made additional changes  due to issues raised by commenters.

The first change made was the Board revised the records preservation log requirement to provide greater flexibility.  Commenters stated that credit unions should not be required to manually create or track information that is already maintained through automated systems.  The Board agreed that the proposal was unnecessarily prescriptive and reduced flexibility for credit unions to develop logs that would be most useful in meeting their operational needs.

To reflect this change, Part 749.2(a)(3) was revised to the following: a records preservation log as determined by the credit union that will aid in locating and easily accessing the vital records.  The log may be in electronic or any other format as determined by the credit union.

The second change the Board made was removing the proposed requirement that credit unions consult with legal counsel when determining what information to include on their logs.  Commenters stated concerns that the requirement could create unnecessary burden and reduce flexibility.  The Board agreed and determined that credit unions should have discretion to decide what information to include on logs based on their operational needs and recordkeeping requirements.

The final rule also removes § 703.105(d) which required reports to be maintained in accordance with Appendix A to Part 749, to remove the inconsistency that would otherwise occur from the removal of Appendix A and revisions to Part 749.

Key Considerations:

  • The changes primarily clarify the existing guidance and regulation.  The rule is not intended to affect the division of responsibilities between NCUA and state regulatory agencies with oversight of Federally Insured State-Chartered Credit Unions (FISCUS).
  • Removal of the appendices does not relieve credit unions of record retention obligations imposed by other applicable laws and regulations.

NASCUS Summary: NCUA Interim Final Rule
Federal Credit Union Non-Interest Charges & Fees
June 2026

On June 8, 2026, the NCUA Board adopted an interim final rule to clarify Federal Credit Unions’ (FCUs) power to charge non-interest charges and fees, including interchange fees, under the Federal Credit Union Act.  

The Interim Final Rule (IFR) can be read here: Preemption-Federal Credit Union Non-Interest Charges and Fees.

Comments on the Interim Final Rule are due by July 9, 2026.

Summary

The IFR supports  NCUA’s assertion that the Federal Credit Union Act grants FCUs the authority to charge and receive non-interest charges and fees, including interchange fees associated with payment card transactions, and therefore state efforts to interfere with that authority would be preempted.

According to NCUA, § 701.21(b) did not expressly address NCUA’s preemption authority related to such fees.  The IFR amends Part 701 by adding § 701.5 which consolidates NCUA’s existing preemption rules by “explicitly” stating FCUs have authority to charge non-interest charges and fees.

The IFR explains that FCUs rely on payment card networks and other third parties to provide services associated with debit and credit card programs. NCUA states that these programs help support FCUs with the ability to offer share accounts and lending as well as supports fraud protection and dispute resolution programs related to card activity by members.

NCUA noted that it consulted with the OCC and adopted language similar to the OCC’s recently issued preemption rule, which reflects a comparable approach to issues involving federal authority. However, it is unclear at this time whether courts will defer to NCUA’s assertion of preemption and litigation remains ongoing.

NASCUS Summary: FinCEN Joint Advisory
Non-Work Authorized Populations and their Employers and Risks to the Integrity of the U.S. Financial System
June 2026

On June 5, 2026, a Joint Advisory was issued by FinCEN, FDIC, OCC, and NCUA titled Non-Work Authorized Populations and Their Employers Risk to the Integrity of the U.S. Financial System.

The advisory was issued pursuant to Executive Order #14406 – Restoring Integrity to America’s Financial System, which directed Treasury to highlight financial crimes associated with the unlawful employment of non-work authorized individuals and the employers, labor brokers, and shell companies that facilitate said activities.

Summary

The advisory is intended to encourage  financial institutions to identify, detect, and report suspicious activity connected to unlawful employment  through existing BSA/AML processes.

The advisory focuses on two primary fraud typologies:

  • Identity Theft – Stolen, or fraudulently obtained personal information is used to obtain employment, financial services, or credit
  • Payroll Fraud – Off-book payroll arrangements, shell companies, labor brokers, payroll tax evasion, and worker’s compensation fraud

Individual Tax Identification Numbers (ITINs). The advisory also addresses enhanced due diligence related to ITINs,  encouraging FIs to consider when use of an ITIN should trigger enhanced due diligence at account opening and for transaction monitoring.

  • Use of ITIN in lieu of SSN or valid employment authorization documents may be identified as a risk factor requiring enhanced due diligence to ensure accounts are not being improperly utilized.
  • Use of an ITIN to obtain credit products or open depository accounts where the applicants lack verified legal presence and there is potential of illicit finance risks associated with the activity.

Red Flags

The advisory includes  eighteen red flag indicators of potential  suspicious activity related to the fraud typologies broken down into three categories: Customer Activity, Larger Companies, and Smaller Companies. With respect to the typologies, the advisory singles out the agriculture, construction, domestic service, hospitality, and staffing industries.

Customer Activity:

1) Uses an SSN that, upon verification, does not match or is inconsistent with Social Security Administration records;

2) Opens an account using a non-U.S. passport or ITIN claiming to be self-employed or operating a small business in the agriculture, construction, domestic service, hospitality, or staffing industries (target industries) and is receiving a significant amount and volume of recurring check deposits from multiple companies before either making a significant and repetitive amount of structured cash withdrawals or issuing low-dollar checks to multiple individuals;

3) Cashes a significant volume of checks drawn on accounts owned by companies in the target industries on a recurring basis at an MSB, including a check cashier;

4) Receives recurring P2P payments from a small, recently established company in the target industries ;

5) Works in the target industries and opens a bank account with an ITIN with little to no transactional activity besides remittances to foreign jurisdictions;

6) Opens an account for a company in the target industries and is attempting to use a Commercial Mail Receiving Agency instead of a business address;

7) Possesses no known prior involvement in the target industries and provides a non-U.S. passport or ITIN as a form of identification when opening an account for a new company in those industries;

8) Makes statements as the account holder or company representative to FI staff that the purpose of the cash withdrawals, negotiation of checks for cash, or check cashing activity is for payroll and the volume, amount, and frequency of transactions are uncharacteristic for a company in the target industries with a small number of employees;

Larger Companies:

9) Has been identified by ICE worksite enforcement news releases and open-source reporting that the customer has a history of worksite compliance violations from ICE;

10) Has significant business operations and transactional activity but with little to no payroll activity commensurate to the customer’s profile;

11) Is making Federal and state payroll tax deposits that are significantly less than what would be expected based on their business operations and associated workforce size;

12) Is issuing a significant and repetitive amount of checks to a singular or small number of recently established companies with little to no online presence;

13) Recently acquired a workers’ compensation policy for a small number of workers that is not commensurate with their customer profile and transactional activity;

Small Companies

14) With beneficial owners that have no known prior involvement with, or in, the company or these industries and may have prior fraud convictions;

15) With minimal to no history of tax- or payroll-related payments to the IRS, state and local tax authorities, or a third-party payroll company despite a large volume of deposits from clients;

16) That conducts large or unusual volumes of cash withdrawals or negotiation of checks for cash when accompanied by another involved person(s) or using an armored car service to deliver bulk cash (i.e., conducting informal or off-the-books payroll);

17) That is issuing recurring, large volumes of checks for under $1,000 that are made payable to a significant number of separate individuals who cash the checks; and/or

18) That is a new customer (i.e., less than two years old) with minimal to no online presence and has indicators of being a shell company.

Key Considerations:

  • SAR procedures should now include the new key term FINANCIALINTEGRITY-2026-A002 in SAR field 2, as well as the narrative, when reporting activity deemed to be suspicious.
  • The advisory encourages financial institutions and the public to report tips or complaints about employers knowingly employing or exploiting unauthorized workers to ICE.
  • The advisory reinforces that FIs should consider all known information and factors when completing risk-based assessments.
  • For most, the practical impact of the advisory is:
    • Reviewing existing risk assessments to update, if necessary
    • Transaction monitoring – confirm new red flags are properly implemented
    • Review of procedures around investigations to determine if any enhancements are needed, while applying risk-based approaches.
  • If policy changes occur related to lending, FIs will want to monitor other fair lending obligations to prevent inadvertent violation of other laws.

NASCUS Proposed Rule Summary:
Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System

June 2026
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) is proposing[1] targeted revisions to the CAMELS framework to refocus ratings on material financial risks and financial condition, reduce subjectivity, and improve transparency.

Overall, the proposal does not change the CAMELS structure but materially changes how ratings are determined and justified.  The proposal represents a significant recalibration of CAMELS—shifting from a process-driven supervisory model toward one anchored in justification through measurable financial risk and condition striving toward mathematical components instead of examiner judgment. For state regulators and credit unions alike, the proposal could enhance consistency, reduce subjectivity, and better align supervisory outcomes with the most material risk to the Share Insurance Fund. 

However, the suggested changes could deter from supervisory conversations regarding identified systemic, programmatic weaknesses that are not yet financially material, impairing the regulators’ ability to proactively address emerging risks as they are developing but not yet critically impacting the institution.  

Comments are due to NCUA by August 17, 2026.

Background

CAMELS (officially known as The Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System or UFIRS) is the standardized framework used by federal and state regulators to evaluate the safety, soundness, and overall condition of banks and credit unions. It ensures all institutions are evaluated uniformly, prioritizing supervision where weaknesses exist.

The history of UFIRS spans four key milestones:

  1. Origins (1979) – Developed by the FFIEC in November 1979, UFIRS was established to create a uniform interagency approach to evaluate financial institutions. Originally, it used a CAMEL acronym—evaluating five components:
    1. Capital Adequacy
    1. Asset Quality
    1. Management
    1. Earnings
    1. Liquidity
  • The Major Revision and Expansion (1996) – In December 1996, FFIEC updated the framework in response to the growing complexity of the financial sector and the increased use of off-balance sheet investments. This overhaul introduced a sixth component: Sensitivity to Market Risk.  This transition established the CAMELS acronym, placing a stronger emphasis on an institution’s risk management practices and requiring examiners to tailor their evaluations based on an institution’s size and complexity.
  • The Modern Evaluation Era (Late 1990s – 2010s) – FFIEC adapts the rating system to cover more specialized operations within financial institutions. This created a family of companion rating systems, including:
    • URSIT: The Uniform Rating System for Information Technology (adopted in 1999 to specifically assess technology and data processing operations).
    • CC Rating System: The Uniform Interagency Consumer Compliance Rating System (updated in 2016 to evaluate how well institutions adhere to consumer protection laws).

Under the UFIRS framework, examiners assign a score of 1 (strongest) to 5 (critically deficient) for each of the six CAMELS categories, alongside an overall composite rating. A better composite rating allows a financial institution more freedom to engage in certain expansionary business activities and signals stability to Congress and the public.

Key Provisions of the Proposed Rule

Stronger Link to Financial Condition & Material Risk

  • Ratings (both component and composite) will prioritize factors that materially affect financial condition and risk profile.
  • Reduced emphasis on:
    • Process issues (policies, documentation)
    • Non-material deficiencies

Implication for regulators:

  • Greater need to tie examination findings directly to current measurable impact on financial risk or condition.
  • Examiner judgment must clearly demonstrate materiality.

Implication for credit unions:

  • Less risk of downgrade for technical/process weaknesses alone.
  • Greater focus on capital, earnings, liquidity, and asset performance outcomes.

Removal of “Special Consideration” for Management Rating

  • Eliminates the requirement to highlight the impact of the Management (M) component in composite ratings.

Implications:

  • More mathematically averaged composite scoring across components without flexibility for supervisory discussions changes to the risk profile.
  • Reduced subjectivity historically tied to Management ratings decreasing the value of examination reporting for board consideration of the institution’s overall risk profile.
  • Composite ratings that only reflect current overall financial condition, not examiner perception of risk management competencies.

Redefinition of Management Component (Major Changes)

  • Narrowed to core risk management effectiveness tied to material financial risk
  • Removes factors such as:
    • Management depth/succession
    • Responsiveness to examiners
    • Community service considerations
  • Introduces a heightened threshold for downgrades:
    • Ratings of 3 or worse generally require material financial risk, unreliable reporting, asset safeguarding failures, or significant noncompliance.

Implications:

For regulators:

  • Must justify Management downgrades based on tangible risk impacts, not qualitative concerns alone.

For credit unions:

  • Reduced likelihood of downgrade based solely on governance or examiner disagreement absent financial impact.

Limiting Impact of Specialty Exam Findings

  • Specialty areas (e.g., BSA/AML, IT, compliance) only affect CAMELS ratings if:
    • They impact financial condition
    • Represent material financial risk
    • Or reflect significant legal noncompliance

Implications:

  • Reduced “double counting” of findings into CAMELS ratings.
  • More clear separation between compliance exams and safety/soundness ratings.

Revised Composite Rating Definitions (1–5)

  • Introduces clearer thresholds tied to financial performance and material risk:
    • 1–2: Strong/satisfactory financial performance with only minor/moderate weaknesses
    • 3: Requires material financial risk or less than satisfactory performance
    • 4–5: Require deficient or critically deficient financial condition

Implications:

  • Ratings of “3” or worse must be supported by demonstrable financial weakness, not just process deficiencies.[2]
  • Raises the bar for downgrades.
  • Enhances consistency across examiners and agencies.

Clearer, More Prescriptive Evaluation Factors

  • Removes “but not limited to” language and replaces with:
    • Defined evaluation factors
    • Additional factors allowed only in exceptional cases, with documentation required
  • Adds specific measurable factors across components:
    • Liquidity: cash flow forecasting, contingency funding
    • Capital: sustainability across economic conditions
    • Earnings: funding costs, commodity exposure
    • Market risk: explicit net interest income sensitivity

Implications:

  • More standardized examinations across states and federal regulators.
  • Improved predictability of ratings for institutions.
  • Deter preemptive discussions in evolution of new products/services and related risks not specifically addressed in CAMELS narratives.

Reduced Emphasis on Broad “Risk Management” Language

  • Replaces high-level expectations with component-specific, measurable expectations.

Implications:

  • Less ambiguity in exams.
  • Stronger alignment between exam findings and measurable financial metrics.
  • Deter preemptive discussions in evolution of new products/services and related risks not specifically addressed in CAMELS narratives.

Improved Transparency and Consistency

  • Standardizes terminology:
    • Financial condition: “strong,” “satisfactory,” “deficient”
    • Risk management: “effective,” “adequate,” “inadequate”
  • Requires clearer documentation when deviating from standard factors.

Implications:

  • Greater defensibility of ratings.
  • Clarity of communication with boards and management.

Modernization of Framework

  • Updates terminology (e.g., ALLL → ACL under CECL)
  • Removes references to reputation risk

Implications:

  • Aligns CAMELS with current accounting and supervisory policy direction.

[1] 91 FR 29128

[2] As of 12/31/2025 NCUA reports 653 federally insured credit unions holding 7.8% of NCUA insured deposits were as 3 rated and117 federally insured credit unions holding .6% of insured deposits are rated 4 or 5.

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) Small Business Lending Final Rule
12 CFR Part 1002

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is revising certain provisions of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)/Regulation B.  The Bureau is amending coverage of certain credit transactions and financial institutions; the small business definition; inclusion of certain data points and how others are collected; and the compliance date.  The Bureau believes these changes will streamline the rule, reduce complexity for lenders, improve data quality, and advance the purposes of Section 1071.

The final rule becomes effective on June 30, 2026; the compliance date for the rule is January 1, 2028.  You can find the final rule here.

Summary

In 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  Section 1071 of Dodd Frank amended the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) to require that financial institutions collect and report to the Bureau certain data regarding applications for credit or women-owned, minority owned and small businesses.  Section 1071’s statutory purposes are to (i) facilitate enforcement of fair lending laws, and (ii) enable communities, governmental entities, and creditors to identify business and community development needs and opportunities of women-owned, minority-owned and small businesses.  Section 1071 directs the Bureau to prescribe such rules and issue such guidance as may be necessary to carry out, enforce and compile data pursuant to Section 1071.

This final rule revises several provisions under the 2023 Small Business Lending final rule.  According to the amended final rule, the Bureau now believes a longer-term approach to advancing the statutory purposes of Section 1071 would be to narrow the scope of the data collected and to limit (as much as possible) any negative impact to the provision of credit to small businesses.

Covered Credit Transactions

  • The Bureau concluded that data collection under the rule (at least initially) should focus on the core, widely used lending products most likely to be foundational to small businesses’ formation and operation.
  • The final rule excludes merchant cash advances, agricultural lending and small dollar loans from the definition of covered credit transaction.

Covered Financial Institutions

  • Data collection under the revised final rule will be limited to larger, core lenders.
  • Farm Credit System(FCS) lenders are excluded from coverage. 
  • The rule raises the origination threshold from 100 to 1000 covered transactions for each of two consecutive years.

Small Businesses

  • The final rule defines a small business as one with a gross annual revenue of $1 million or less.  The rule decreased the gross annual revenue threshold from $5 million or less.

Data Points

  • Under the revised final rule, data collection will focus specifically on data points specified in Section 1071 and a limited number of other data points needed to facilitate the collection of statutory data points. 
  • The final rule removes the discretionary data points for application method, application recipient, denial reasons, pricing information and number of workers.
  • The final rule amends the provisions on time and manner of data collection to remove certain requirements that are not statutorily required and appear to anticipate or presume non-compliance with the rule.

Compliance Dates

  • The revised final rule extends the compliance date to January 1, 2028 for all institutions that are covered by the rule.
  • The revised final rule also features a “special transitional rule” that permits (but does not require) financial institutions to use the calendar years 2025 and 2026, instead of 2026 and 2027, for purposes of determining whether they must comply with the rule beginning January 1, 2028.

CFPB Final Rule Summary: Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B)
12 CFR Part 1002

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued a Final Rule on the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.

The final rule is effective as of July 21, 2026 and the rule can be found here.

Summary

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued a final rule that amends provisions related to disparate impact, discouragement of applicants or prospective applicants, and special purpose credit programs under Regulation B, the regulation that implements the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). 

In November 2025, the Bureau issued a notice of proposed rulemaking amending Regulation B.  The Bureau is now finalized the rule as proposed.  Specifically, the Bureau amended provisions in Regulation B, 12 CFR Part 1002, pertaining to whether disparate impact is cognizable under the Act; under what circumstances a creditor may be deemed to be discouraging an applicant or prospective applicant; and under what conditions a creditor may offer special purpose credit programs (SPCPs).

The final rule provides that ECOA does not authorize disparate-impact liability (effects test); it redefines “discouragement” under the regulation and adds prohibitions/conditions for Special Purpose Credit Programs (SPCP).

Disparate Impact 

  • Under a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff may challenge unlawful discrimination facially neutral policies that have a disproportionate effect along prohibited basis lines.  The rule notes that the Supreme Court has held that disparate impact claims are cognizable under certain statutes such as under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Fair Housing Act (FHA), etc.  However, the Bureau notes that the Supreme Court has not examined whether a disparate-impact claim is permitted under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). 
  • The rule also notes that the ECOA does not specifically state that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Act nor does it contain “effects-based language” that has been found in other statutes to invoke disparate-impact liability.  The Bureau has previously relied on legislative history to authorize disparate impact liability. 
  • Under the revised final rule, the Bureau now determines that the previous conclusions that disparate impact claims are cognizable under ECOA are incorrect and not the best interpretation of ECOA.  The Bureau now concludes that “effects-based language” text is crucial for interpreting the status and in the absence of effects-based language or other textual signals indicating that disparate-impact liability is cognizable, the Bureau determined that the best reading of the ECOA does not authorize disparate-impact liability.

Discouragement

  • Regulation B provides that “a creditor shall not make any oral or written statement, in advertising or otherwise, to applicants or prospective applications that would discourage on a prohibited basis a reasonable person from making or pursuing an application.  Language regarding the prohibition of discouragement was implemented in the final rule of 1975. At the time, the Federal Reserve Board stated that it believed a prohibition against discouragement was “necessary to protect applicants against discriminatory acts occurring before an application is initiated.”  At the time, the Board believed this provision was necessary to prevent creditors from circumventing the ECOA’s prohibition against discrimination by deterring prospective applications from even applying for credit.
  • The final rule revised the discouragement provision.  The Bureau notes that the previous interpretation of this provision was too broad and was applied to scenarios that should not be characterized as “discouragement” under the ECOA.  In particular, the revised rule is intended to protect creditor statements that may be controversial but would not cause a “reasonable” person to believe that the creditors would deny them credit or offer them credit on less favorable terms than other borrowers.  The Bureau further relays its concern that constraints on these types of business practices and statements harm the marketplace by unnecessarily regulating business practices and limiting expression. The rule concludes that such controversial statements do not rise to the level of statements an “objective creditor would know, or should know, would cause a reasonable person to believe the creditor would deny them credit or offer them credit on less favorable terms than other borrowers.   

Special Purpose Credit Programs

  • Generally, the ECOA prohibits a creditor from discriminating on a prohibited basis regarding any aspect of a credit transaction.  However, Section 701(c)(3) states that it does not constitute discrimination under the Act for a creditor “to refuse to extend credit offered pursuant to…any special purpose credit program offered by a profit-making organization to meet special social needs which meets standards prescribed in regulations by the Bureau.   
  • According to the relevant legislation history, the intent of this section of the ECOA, is to authorize the Board (and now Bureau) to specify standards for the exemption of classes of transactions when it has been clearly demonstrated on the public record that without such exemption the consumers involved would effectively be denied credit. 
  • An SPCP is permitted to require its participants to share one or more common characteristics that would otherwise be prohibited bases so long as the program does not evade the requirements of ECOA or Regulation B.   Under the revised final rule, an SPCP is prohibited from using race, color, national origin or sex of the applicant, as the “common characteristic” in determining eligibility for the SPCP.  The Bureau concluded that an SPCP offered or participated in by a for-profit organization that uses race, color, national origin or sex as eligibility criteria is beyond what is necessary to meet the congressional intent of SPCPs.
  • In addition, the Bureau has adopted new “conditions” that should be used to determine eligibility for such programs.  Under the new final rule, religion, marital status, age or income derived from a public assistance program should be used as eligibility criteria. 

NASCUS Proposed Rule Summary
NCUA Rules & Regulations 12 CFR Parts 702, 704, 706, 745, and 747: Implementing the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act for the Issuance of Stablecoins by Entities Subject to the Jurisdiction of the National Credit Union Administration

May 2026
The NCUA proposes amendments to 12 CFR Parts 702, 704, 706, 745, and 747 to implement portions of the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (GENIUS Act) [1].  The proposal supplements proposed regulations issued in February 2026 through the creation of a new 12 CFR Part 706[2], which establishes a federal framework for licensing and supervising Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuers (PPSIs) that are subsidiaries of federally insured credit unions (FICUs).

Key issues covered by this rule include:

  • Operational standards for stablecoin issuers
  • Reserve and liquidity requirements
  • Risk management and governance
  • Redemption obligations
  • Custody, reporting, and supervision
  • Capital and operational resilience

The proposed rule may be read in its entirety here[3].

Comments are due to NCUA by July 17, 2026.

Background

Under the GENIUS Act, “insured depository institutions,” which the Act defines to include both FDIC-insured depository institutions and FICUs (collectively “IDIs”), cannot be issuers of payment stablecoins. Instead, IDIs must issue stablecoins indirectly through subsidiaries.

The GENIUS Act defines the term “subsidiary of an insured credit union” to mean:

  1. an organization providing services to the insured credit union that are associated with the routine operations of credit unions, as described in section 107(7)(I) of the Federal Credit Union Act[4];
  2. a credit union service organization, as such term is used under CFR 12 part 712, with respect to which the insured credit union has an ownership interest or to which the insured credit union has extended a loan; and
  3. a subsidiary of a State chartered insured credit union authorized under State law.

Under the Genius Act, only state or federally authorized PPSIs may issue a payment stablecoin in the United States, subject to certain exceptions and safe harbors. PPSIs are subject to a number of requirements, including requirements related to reserves, capital, liquidity, illicit finance, and information technology risk management standards. Among those requirements, PPSIs must:

  •  maintain reserves backing the stablecoin on a one-to-one basis using U.S. currency or certain other liquid assets;
  •  publicly disclose their redemption policy; and
  • publish the details of their reserves monthly.

The GENIUS Act details the process for the federal bank agencies (FBAs), which include the NCUA, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board), to administer application for PPSI licenses, PPSI examination and supervision, and enforcement authority.

The GENIUS Act also addresses provision of custody services for payment stablecoins; application of the Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money laundering and economic sanctions requirements; treatment of payment stablecoin issuers in insolvency proceedings; and disclosures related to the absence of federal backing and deposit insurance for stable coins[5]

Key Provisions of the Proposed Rule

To  implement the GENIUS Act by establishing a regulatory framework for payment stablecoins issued through FICU  subsidiaries, the proposal introduces the new Part 706, issued for comment in February (NASCUS comments may be read here), as the core regulatory structure and makes conforming amendments to Parts 702 (Capital), 704 (Corporate CUs), 745 (Share Insurance), and 747 (Enforcement) to integrate stablecoin activities into the existing credit union federal regulatory regime.

Proposed changes to Parts 702, 704, 706, 745, and 747 include:

  • Terminology updates to incorporate stablecoin-related definitions
  • Alignment with:
    • GENIUS Act statutory framework
    • New Part 706 requirements
  • Clarifications to avoid:
    • Misinterpretation of stablecoins as insured products
    • Regulatory gaps across credit union activities

What is fundamentally changing:

  • Part 706 introduces an entirely new supervisory regime for stablecoin issuance.
  • Other parts (702, 704, 745, 747) are conformed to align the stable coin rules with the existing credit union regulatory structure.

Strategic implications:

  • FISCU credit unions must comply with a single NCUA authorized entry point into stablecoin activities
  • NCUA gains:
    • Potential foothold into future authority over FISCU subsidiaries
    • Preemption of SSA authority to allow investment in a state authorized PPSI
    • Enhanced risk containment tools
  • The rule requires:
    • A strict firewall between insured shares and stablecoins
    • A strong emphasis on liquidity, transparency, and prudential discipline

For Credit Unions

  • Limits options by mandating a single, NCUA regulated pathway into digital payments innovation for all federally insured credit unions
  • Requires significant investment in:
    • Governance
    • Technology infrastructure
    • Liquidity and risk management systems
  • Requires use of CUSOs and/or structured subsidiaries

For Regulators

  • Expands NCUA role into digital asset supervision, as well as authority over subsidiaries and/or CUSOs
  • Preempts the federal-state dynamic:
    • Federal dominance for FICU PPSI authorization and investment
    • State role preserved for consumer protection

Section-by-Section Analysis

12 CFR Part 702 – Capital Adequacy (Natural Person Credit Unions)

§702.2 – Net Worth (Definition)

Change: Deconsolidation of PPSI financials

  • Requires FICUs to exclude (deconsolidate) PPSI subsidiary financials from regulatory capital:
    • For regulatory capital purposes, remove PPSI assets, liabilities, and equity from balance sheet.
    • Deduct retained earnings attributable to the PPSI (if not up streamed).
    • Remove investments/receivables from the PPSI from total assets.

§702.104 – Risk-Based Capital Ratio

  • Mirrors above treatment:
    • Ensures PPSI-related exposures do not inflate risk-based capital.
    • Applies consistent deduction/adjustment (deconsolidation) approach across capital measures.

Implication                  

  • Prevents:
    • Double counting of capital.
    • Artificial capital strength from stablecoin subsidiaries.

12 CFR Part 704 – Corporate Credit Unions

§704.2 – Definitions (Retained Earnings & Tier 1 Capital)

Retained Earnings

  • Must exclude income retained by a consolidated PPSI unless distributed.

Tier 1 Capital

  • Adjustments parallel Part 702:
    • Deconsolidate PPSI-related balances.
    • Exclude:
      • PPSI equity
      • PPSI-related assets/receivables

Capital and Asset Calculations

  • Investments in PPSIs:
    • Removed from capital base.
    • Avoid artificial enhancement of leverage capacity.

Implication

  • Ensures:
    • Corporate credit unions do not leverage stablecoin subsidiaries for capital benefit.
    • Alignment with safety and soundness principles.

12 CFR Part 706 (See also Proposed Rule for 12 CFR Part 706[6])

Subpart A – Licensing & Approval (12 CFR Parts 706.101 – 112)

  • Establishes requirements for:
    • Approval of FICU subsidiaries as Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuers (PPSIs).
  • Includes:
    • Joint applications (subsidiary + FICU parent).
    • Evaluation of:
      • Directors/officers (integrity, background checks)
      • Ownership/control structures
    • Ongoing approval conditions.

Subpart B – Operational Standards

Permitted Activities (§706.201)

Limited to:

  • Issuance and redemption of stablecoins
  • Reserve management
  • Custody/safekeeping
  • Ancillary supporting functions (assess fees/facilitate transactions)

Prohibited Activities

  • Paying interest or yield on stablecoins
  • Rehypothecation of reserves
  • Misrepresenting federal backing/insurance
  • Deceptive naming (e.g., “U.S. backed”)

Reserve Requirements (§706.202)

Core prudential requirement: 1:1 backing

Key Components:

  • Must maintain reserve assets ≥ outstanding issuance value
  • Reserves must be:
    • Identifiable
    • Segregated
    • Held at eligible institutions

Permissible Reserve Assets:

  • Cash
  • Deposits/share accounts
  • Short-term Treasuries (≤93 days)
  • Repo/reverse repo
  • Government money market funds
  • Approved liquid federal assets
  • Tokenized forms of the above

Additional Requirements:

  • Monthly:
    • Public reserve disclosure
    • Independent audit
  • Liquidity and diversification standards (two approaches proposed):
    • Principles-based OR
      • Sufficiently diverse to manage potential credit, liquidity, interest rate, and price risks.
      • Monitor and manage concentrations of risk profile
      • Plus limits found in prescriptive language option below
    • Prescriptive thresholds
      • 10% of reserve assets as deposits or FRB deposits
      • 30% of reserve assets as deposits or FRB deposits unconditionally receivable within five days
      • No more than 40% of reserve assets at any one eligible financial institution
      • No more than 50% of the 10% reserve requirement in any one eligible financial institution
      • Maintain reserve asset weighted average maturity of no more than 20 days

Redemption Requirements (§706.203)

  • Must:
    • Redeem at par value
    • Within ≤2 business days
  • Stress provision:
    • If >10% redeemed in 24 hours → up to 7 days redemption
  • Mandatory disclosures:
    • Redemption procedures
    • Fees
    • Issuer identity

Risk Management (§706.204)

Comprehensive standards including:

  • Internal controls and audit functions
  • Interest rate and liquidity risk
  • Insider/affiliate transactions
  • Third-party/vendor risk
  • IT and cybersecurity controls
  • Business continuity and incident response
  • BSA/AML and sanctions compliance


Supervision & Reporting (§706.205)

Examinations:

  • Default: Annual full-scope exam
  • Extended cycle (14–24 months) possible for smaller/low-risk PPSIs

Reporting:

  • Weekly supervisory data (confidential)
  • Quarterly financial reports
  • Annual audit (for large issuers)

Enforcement:

  • Authority to:
    • Require remediation plans
    • Suspend issuance
    • Force liquidation (if reserve failures persist)

Subpart C – Custody Requirements (§706.301 – 304)

Applies to “Covered Custodians”:

  • FICUs or PPSIs holding:
    • Reserve assets
    • Stablecoins used as collateral
    • Private keys

Core Requirements:

  • Assets treated as customer property
  • Strict segregation / non-commingling
  • Protection from creditor claims
  • Oversight of sub-custodians

Subpart D – Capital Framework (§706.400 – 402)

Key Elements:

  • Minimum capital requirement:
    • Tailored, case-by-case (no fixed ratio initially)
  • Capital components:
    • Common equity tier 1
    • Additional tier 1

Operational Backstop:

  • PPSIs must maintain:
    • Highly liquid assets covering operating expenses

Subpart E – AML/CFT Oversight (§706.501 – 504)

  • Incorporates:
    • Bank Secrecy Act
    • Treasury/FinCEN requirements
  • Provides:
    • NCUA supervisory and enforcement framework

12 CFR Part 745 – Share Insurance

§745.2 – Account Definition (Technology Neutrality)

New Clarification in Definition

  • Insurance eligibility is independent of technology:
    • Applies equally to:
      • Traditional accounts
      • Tokenized share accounts (DLT/blockchain)

§745.6 – Corporate Accounts

Key Clarification

  • PPSI reserve accounts:
    • Insured as a single corporate account only
    • No pass-through insurance to stablecoin holders

Limitations

  • Only applies where:
    • Product meets statutory “share account” definition
  • Tokenized products:
    • Not automatically insurable unless structured correctly

Practical Impact

  • Retail stablecoin holders are NOT insured
  • PPSI funds:
    • Treated like corporate deposits
  • Clarifies:
    • No implicit federal guarantee for stablecoins

[1] Public Law 119-27

[2] 91 FR 6531

[3] 91 FR 28956

[4] 12 U.S.C. 1757(7)(I)

[5] See 12 U.S.C. 5903(e).

[6] 91 FR 6531